In this paper the key storage problem associated with the provision of secure communications between every pair of users in a large network is described, and a possible method of alleviating the problem is discussed. This method, based on the use of finite incidence structures with special properties called key distribution patterns, is shown to generalize earlier work in the area. The more general formulation of the storage saving scheme contained here enables use to be made of the extensive body of knowledge already existing on the theory of block designs. From this theory we are able to extract a number of new families of examples of potentially useful key distribution systems.
Introduction
Suppose there exists a network of v nodes, PI, PZ' ...,P v say, where each node wishes to have the facility to communicate with each other node in a secure way. As an immediate consequence, each pair of users {Pi, Pj} requires a distinct cryptographic key known to them but to no other user.
If conventional (i.e. symmetric or private key) cryptography is being used, then the key management problem is commonly solved by using a key distribution centre (KDC). This KDC know~ a distinct key encrypting key for each of the users in the network. When a pair of users wish to communicate securely, the KDC manufactures a key to be used by this pair of users, and then sends it to these users encrypted under their respective key encrypting keys.
However, this scheme requires an online KDC and a network which is responsive enough to enable keys to be distributed only when they are actually needed. It is not difficult to imagine situations where this is not a viable assumption. In such circumstances one solution would be for every user to be equipped in advance with a separate key for use with each other user in the network. Note that a KDC would almost certainly still be required to coordinate all the key manufacturing and distribution processes.
This type of system clearly requires each user to store v-I keys and usually for the KDC to store tv(v-l) keys. In large netwerks, where it might also be necessary to store "old versions" of keys, the total storage requirement could increase to some multiple of tv(v -1). Ultimately, these requirements could give rise to considerable storage problems at both the KDC and at the user node. Possible solutions to thip roblem have been discussed by a number of authors, e.g. Blom [2, 3] , and Jansen [8] ; we consider further solutions in the rather more general context previously outlined in a recent paper, [9] , where the limitations of Jansen's construction were noted.
We propose the use of a certain special kind of finite incidence structure to resolve this problem. Each user is then issued with a relatively small set of "sub keys", and each key to be used by a pair of users is made up from a combination of some of these subkeys. Note that Blom's ideas, [2, 3] , do not precisely fit this type of model since he assumes the existence of some kind of algebraic structure on the subkeys. To proc~ed we require some notation.
Afinite incidence structure.1{= (.'?J', [jJ, I) consists of two finite non-empty sets .'?J' and [jJ and an incidence relation I where I C .'?J' x [jJ. We conventionally let I.'?J'I = v and I [jJ I = b, and call the elements of .'?J' points and the elements of [jJ blocks. If (P, x) E I, where P E.'?J' and x E [jJ, then we say that P is incident with x. It is often convenient to consider the set of points incident with a block x, or the set of blocks incident with a point P, and we use (x) and (P) respectively to denote these sets. Hence we write (Pi) n (P» for the set of blocks incident with both Pi and Pj.
As well as using v and b for the total number of points and blocks respectively, we write r(i) for I (Pi) I, i.e. the number of blocks incident with Pi, and k(j) for l(xj)l. Finally, we also let A(i,j)= j(Pi)n(Pj)j and s(i,j) = I(Xi)n(Xj)j.
If every block is incident with the same number of points (i.e. k(i) = k for some constant k) and no two blocks are incident with the same set of points then .1{ is called a design, and these special incidence structures have been well studied, particularly because of their applications in statistical design of experiments. The interested reader is referred to two recent books on this subject, [1, 7] ; where relevant we use here the notation of Hughes and Piper, [7] , and unless otherwise stated, all results on designs used here can be found in their book. In line with common practice in design theory, if every point is incident with the same number of blocks, then we write r for this number (i.e. r = r(j) for all j).
If ;:Y{ is a finite incidence structure with v ~ 3, then we call .1{ a key distribution pattern (KDP) iff the following property holds:
To use the notion of a KDP we now identify our set of network nodes with :P and a set of subkeys with $, where (:P, $, I) is a KDP. Then the key to be used by users Pi and Pj to communicate with one another is made up from a combination of the subkeys in (Pi) n (Pj), and since we have a KDP, Property 1.1 implies that no other user knows all the sub keys in this set. To combine the set of subkeys to make an N-bit link key one might typically define each sub key to be an N-bit vector. over GF (2) . and combine the sub keys using some sort of "one way function~'.
Before proceeding we attempt to justify our insistence that v ~ 3. If v = 2, then there is really no key distribution problem in this context; note also that, given v ~ 3, Corollary 2.3 below implies that b ~ 3.
In addition, note that Property 1.1 has a simple geometrical interpretation. The axiom is precisely equivalent to demanding that the incidence structure has line size 2 (in the language of design theory. a line through points A and B is the set of points contained in the intersection of the point sets (x), for all blocks XE (A) n (B).
To conclude these introductory remarks we exhibit the existence of some KDPs.
Then this corresponds exactly with the case where each pair of users is provided with a unique key. This is what we call the trivial KDP on u points, since using this KDP is equivalent to not using a KDP system at all. In the notation of design theory .:Y{ is a trivial 2-(u, 2, 1) design. So, in a biplane, any two blocks have 2 points in common, and it is then immediate to see that a biplane must be a KDP.
We now consider three different ways in which two KDPs can be joined to give a new larger KDP. The proofs that these constructions actually give KDPs can be found in a more general setting in Section 3 below. Construction 1.5. Suppose that .1{= (.'JjJ,yc, $,yc, I,yc) and fJ!= (.'JjJf}!, $f}!, If}!) are KDPs having v,yc, b,yc and vf}!, bf}! points and blocks respectively. This construction combines these two KDPs to give a new KDP with v,yc+ vf}! points and b,yc° bf}! blocks, and which we will denote by vIt=(.'JjJ"", $"", 1.It). Let f1J.,t{=f1J.xUf1J!l!' fII.,t{={(X,Y):XEfII.x, YEfII!l!} and define 1.,t{ as follows. If PEf1J.,t{, then P is incident with block (x, y) iff eitherP E f1J.x and P is incident with x in .:Y{, or P E f1J!l! and P is incident with Y in f£. More informally we write fII.,t{={XUY:XEfII.x,YEfII!l!}' where the incidence is "inherited" from .:Y{ and f£, and where by the union xU Y of two blocks we mean the block z with the property that (z) = (x) U (y). Construction 1.6. Suppose that $=(~,x, ~,x, I,x) and .P=(~p, ~p, Ip) are KDPs having v,x, b,x and v.'£, bp points and blocks respectively. This construction combines these two KDPs to give a new KDP with v,x+ vp-1 points and b,x+ r,x(;)(bp -1) blocks (where r ,x(;) is the number of blocks incident with a chosen point from ~,x), and which we will denote by .;(( = (~.,(t, ~.,(t, I.,(t).
First choose some PiE~,x, and let ~.,(t=(~,x-{Pi})U~p. Now divide the blocks of $into two subclasses, namely those which are incident with Pi and those which are not, and call these classes gJ and :!ll respectively (note that gJU:!ll = ~,x).
We now set f!lJ.g= 11l U {xU Y-{Pi}:
where the union of blocks is defined precisely as in the previous example, and the incidence relation is derived directly from the incidence relations in .:Y{ and !l!. ' First let
Now divide the blocks of .1{into two subclasses, namely those which are incident with Pi and those which are not, and call these classes fll.1{ and ~.1{ respectively (note that fll.1{ U ~.1{= /!iJ.1{). Similarly divide the blocks of fI! into two subclasses, namely those which are incident with Qj and those which are not, and call these classes fllp and ~p respectively (note that fllpU~p= /!iJp). We now set
These examples and constructions show that there are many nontrivial kDPs. We now need some way of assessing the relative usefulness of these KDPs in terms of the amount of storage space that they can save. Three primary objectives must be firstly to minimize the total number of subkeys, i:e. to minimize b (which determines the amount of storage required at the KDC), secondly to minimize the total storage required at all the network nodes, i.e. to minimize r(I)+r (2)+ ...+r(v) and thirdly to minimize the maximum storage required at anyone node, i.e. to minimize max{r(i)}. Different situations may require other measures of usefulness.
It should now be clear that, of the three construction methods described above, Construction 1.7 is potentially the most useful, since the KDPs constructed this way will have smaller b for given v, which is one of our chief objectives. We conclude these introductory remarks by giving a small example of Construction 1.7; note that this example is unrealistically small. Example 1.8. Let ;1{and !I! both be 2- (7,4,2) If we "choose" points PI and QI, then the incidence structure"'" obtained using Construction 1.7 has point set 
Key distributiou patterns: Some theoretical results
Before proceeding to any theoretical results on KDPs we digress briefly to consider a result on systems of subsets of a set. This result will in turn give us some useful inequalities for KDPs. The result quoted here can be found in Bollobas' in-valuable book, [4] .
Let fB be a finite set of cardinality b, i.e. IfB I = b. Also let .(jJ(fB) be the set of all subsets of fB, i.e. the power set of fB, and hence .(jJ(fB) has cardinality lb. If 9'is a subset of .(jJ(fB), then 9'is known as a Sperner system iffSc T and S, Te 9' implies S= T.
Then we immediately have: ) is a finite incidence structure, then $ is a KDP iff {(P) n (PI): P, P' distinct elements of.':/l} is a Sperner system of subsets of /?JJ.
Proof. Suppose first that .1{ is a KDP. Choose P, P', Q, Q' e.'J' (P, P' and Q, Q' are distinct pairs) and suppose that (P) n (P') C(Q) n (Q'). Then
and so, by Property 1.1, either P=Q and P'=Q' or P=Q' and P'=Q. Hence {(P) n (P'): P, P' distinct elements of .'J'} is a Sperner system of subsets of fB. Now suppose that {(P) n (P'): P, P' distinct elements of .'J'} is a Sperner system of subsets of fB and suppose also that (p}n(PjC(Q) for some P,P',Qe.'J'. Then (p)n (P')C(Q)n (Q') for any Q'e.'J', and hence either P=Q or P'=Q. Hence. Finally note that it should be clear that if ..1t = (f!IJ, .'?iI, I) is a KDP then {(P): Pe f!IJ} is an intersecting family of subsets of .'?iI (where we define an intersecting family of subsets to be one having the property that any two elements of the family will have a non-empty intersection). Hence, by a result from Bollobas, [4, Chapter 7], we know that V:52b-l. Unfortunately this bound is always weaker than the bound of Corollary 2.3 and so we do not consider it further here.
Having established these very basic inequalities we consider ways in which we can impose additional structure on the KDPs. We do this with the hope that it will indicate better how to construct examples having desirable properties.
Firstly note that, by Result 2.1, in order to obtain a Sperner system of maximal cardinality it is necessary to choose subsets all having the same size. Hence, by considering Lemma 2. A second way in which we might impose additional structure on a KDP is by assuming that it is a I-design, i.e. by supposing that r(i) = r for every i e {I, 2, ..., v} and k(j)=k for everyje{I,2,...,b}.
Then we have: Lemma 2.6. If.Y{ is both a KDP and a I-design, then either .Y{ is a trivial KDP or r~3, k~3 and A(i,j)~2for every i,je{I, 2,...,u}.
Proof. If r = 1 or k = 1 then b = v = 1 which contradicts our definition of KDP. If r= 2, then since we must have 1 ~A(i, j) < r= 2 for every i andj, .:Y{is a balanced KDP with A=I, i.e. .:Y{is a 2-(v,k, 1) design with r=2. Hence b~v, and since bk=vr in a I-design and Av(v-I)=bk(k-I) in a 2-design, [7J, k~r=2, i.e. b=v=3 and k=r=2, and .:Y{is the unique trivial KDP having r=2. If k = 2, then, since no two blocks are incident with the same set of points, every pair of points are incident with a unique block which is itself incident with no other points. Hence .:Y{ is balanced, i.e. .:Y{ is a 2-(v, 2, 1) design which must be a trivial KDP.
Finally now suppose that k, r~ 3, and suppose that A(i,j) = 1. If we let (Pi) n (Pj) = {xs}, then Xs cannot be incident with any other point by the definition of KDP. Hence r= 2, contradicting our assumption. 0
3.
Collusion and collusion-resistant key distribution patterns As Blom, [2] , has pointed out this type of system can easily break down if two or more people pool their sets of subkeys. More formally, if P, P', Q, Q' E f:1J satisfy (P) n (P')c (Q) U (Q') (where P, P' and Q, Q' are both distinct pairs) then if the users corresponding to Q and Q' pool their sets of subkeys, they have sufficient information to compute the key used by users P and P' to communicate with one another. This is clearly a most undesirable property, and so we now add an additional constraint in order to construct what we call collusion-resistant KDPs.
If w~ 1, then define a w-collusion resistant KDP (w-CRKDP) to be a finite incidence structure .:Y{= (f:1J,~, I) such that v ~ 3, no two blocks are incident with the same set of points, and if 1 ~ i,j ~ v and H = {h(I), h(2), ..., h(w)} c {I, 2, ..., v}, then we have: More informally we now have an incidence structure with the following property. For any pair of points, A, B say, the set of blocks with which they are both incident is not contained in the union of the sets of blocks incident with any set of up to w points unless A or B are contained in the set. Hence, in our application, if at most w users pool all their subkeys they will be unable to deduce any of the keys used in the network apart from those which are used by at least one of them.
Note that it should be clear that the definition of l-CRKDP corresponds precisely to the previous definition of KDP. We now provide some examples of w-CRKDPs for w> 1. for every S E { 1, 2, ..., w}. Since we know that A2> w).3, we have an immediate contradiction and the desired result follows.
The standard relation amongst the parameters of a 3-design means that the condition A2>WA3 is equivalent to assuming that v>w(k-2)+2.
Also note that in any 3-design A2 > A3, and hence any 3-design is a KDP; in geometrical terms it should be clear that in a 3-design every line has size 2.
Before considering any further examples we examine some geometrical implications of our definition. We first need some basic definitions.
If .:Y{=(~, flJ,I) is an arbitrary finite incidence structure, and PE~, then we define the internal structure of .:Y{ at P, written .:Y{ p, to be the structure having point set ~-{P} and block set {XE flJ: x contains P}. In addition we define the external structure of .:Y{at P, written .:Y{P, to be the structure having point set ~-{P} and block set {XE flJ: x does not contain P}. We can now state: Lemma 3.4. Suppose that..1{= (.'J1, f!lJ, I) is afinite incidence structure," Then ifw~ 1, ..1{ is a (w+ l)-CRKDP if and only if..1{P is a w-CRKDP for every PE.'J1, Proof. First suppose that .:Y{is a (w+ l)-CRKDP. Choose Pe.tffJ, and then choose a further pair of point~, C, D say, from .:Y{P. Suppose iJ)f is a further set of w points from .:Y{ P. Then iJ)f U {P} is a (w + 1 )-set of points from .:Y{, and hence there is a block incident with both C and D which is not incident with any point from iJ)fU {P}. Since this block is not incident with P it must be a block of .:Y{P, and the result follows. Now suppose that .:Y{P is a w-CRKDP for every Pe.tffJ. Now choose a pair of points C, D e .tffJ and further let .q);" be a set of w + 1 points from .tffJ (not containing C or D). If we suppose that Q e.q);", then we know that .:Y{Q is a w-CRKDP. Hence there exists a block in .:Y{Q which is incident with both C and D but which is not incident with any point from f!l: -{ Q}. This immediately gives us a block in ..1{ which is incident with C and D but yet is not incident with any point in f!l:. The result follows. 0
It is well known that if ..1{is a I-design, then..1{P is a (t-I)-design for any point P from ..1{. Combining this knowledge with Example 3.3 and Lemma 3.4, we immediately have: Example 3.5. Suppose .:1tis a (w+2)-design, where w~ 1. Then .:1tis a w-CRKDP.
However, having made this observation we note that the use of t-designs with t ~ 4 is of limited value in our context. Unfortunately it is true that, if t~4, then b~ vCz. Hepce, if a t-design is used with t~4 the number of pieces of information to be stored at the key distribution centre will be at least as great as for the trivial KDP.
Finally we observe that Constructions 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 can be used to give wCRKDPs for arbitrary values of w. In each case suppose that .:1t and fI! are wCRKDPs, and, as proved below, the derived KDP .,(( is always also a w-CRKDP. Again it should be clear that usually Construction 1.7 is the most useful means of construction.
3.1.
Proof that Construction 1.5 gives a w-CRKDP Choose any two points A,BegJ"". There are three cases to consider, namely: (i) A,BegJ.x, (ii) A,BegJ!/!, and (iii) A egJ.x, BegJ!/!. In each case suppose that there exists a w-subset r6'C gJ "" such that every block in ~""that contains A and B is also incident with at least one element of r6'. For the purposes of the discussion below let r6'=r6'IUr6'2, where r6'lcgJ.xand r6'2CgJ!/!. Case (i). Suppose xefB.1{ is incident with both A and B. Then xUye fBvtt is incident with both A and B, for any y e fB 9!. By our assumption all these blocks xU y must be incident with at least one element of rb'. If x is not incident with an element of rb'1, then this implies that every block y e fB9! is incident with at least one element of rb'z, a contradiction since I rb'zl ~ w. Hence x is incident with a block of rb'1, again giving a contradiction since I rb' II ~ w.
Case (ii). Since the definition of vi{ is completely symmetric in .:Y{ and fI!, this case follows using an identical argument to Case (i).
Case (iii). If P);"C~.:Y{ contains all the~locks incident with A, and auC~!Z contains all the blocks incident with B, then the set of blocks of ~.,{( incident with both A and B is precisely {xU y: XE f?J::, y E au}. Hence either every block of P);"is incident with at least one point of rb'l or every block of au is incident with. at least one point of rb'2. In either event we again have a contradiction. The result now follows. 0 3.2. Proof that Construction 1.6 gives a w-CRKDP Choose any two points A, B E.'J'.,It. There are three cases to consider, namely: (i) A,BE.'J',x, (ii) A,BE.'J'!l!' and (iii) A E.'J',x, BE.'J'!l!. In each case suppose that there exists a w-subset rcC.'J'.,It such that every block i~ fIJ.,It that contains A and B is also incident with at least one element from rc. For the purposes of the discussion below let rc= rc 1 u rc2, where rc 1 C.'J',x and rc2 C.'J'!l!.
Case (i). Define rc'C.'J',x by rc'= rc1 if rc= rc1 and rc'= rc1 U {Pi} otherwise. Then rc' is a subset of .'J',x containing at most w points. Suppose x E fIJ,x is incident with both A and B. First suppose that x is incident with Pi. Then (x-{Pi}) U Y E fIJ.,It is also incident with both A and B and hence with at least one element, Q say, from rc. If QE rc1 then QE rc' and x is incident with Q. If QE rc2, then PiE rc' and x is incident with Pi, i.e. x is always incident with at least one element of rc'. Now suppose that x is not incident with Pi. Then x E fIJ.,It is also incident with both A and B and hence with at least one element, Q say, from rc. Moreover Q must be in rc 1 (since x E fIJ,x), and hence Q is in rc'. Hence, regardless of the choice for x it is always incident with at least one element of rc', giving the desired contradiction. Proof that Construction 1.7 gives a w-CRKDP Choose any two points A, B e E1' vIt. There are three cases to consider, namely: (i) A,BeE1'.x, (ii) A,BeE1'Jl!' and (iii) A eE1'.x, BeE1'Jl!. In each suppose that there exists a w-subset ~CE1'vIt such that every block in flJvIt that contains A and B is also incident with at least one element from ~. For the purposes of the discussion below let ~= ~1 U ~2' where ~1 CE1'.x and ~2CE1'Jl!' Case (i). Define ~/CE1'.x by ~/= ~1 if ~= ~1 and ~/= ~1 U {Pi} otherwise. Then ~ I is a subset of E1'.x containing at most w points. Suppose x e fIJ.x is incident with both A and B. First suppose that x is incident with Pi, Then (x -{Pi}) U (y -{Qj }) e flJvIt is also incident with both A and B and hence with at least one ele-ment, R say, from ~. If Re ~l then Re ~' and x is incident with R. If Re ~2, then Pi e ~ 1 and x is incident with Pi, i.e. x is always incident with at least one element of ~ '. Now suppose that x is not incident with Pi, Then x e .'?iJ,-H is also incident with both A and B and hence with at' least one element, R say, from ~. Moreover R must be in ~ 1 (since x e.'?iJ.1(), and hence R is in ~ ': Henge, regardless of the choice for x it is always incident with at least one element of ~/, giving the desired contradiction.
Case (ii). Since the definition of .;{tis completely symmetric in .Y{and.P, this case follows using an identical argument to Case (i).
Case (iii). If .Pl:C f!iJ.x contains all the blocks incident with both A and Pi, and W C f!iJ!l: contains all the blocks incident with Band Q}, then the set of blocks of f!iJ""incident with both A and B is precisely {(x-{Pi}) U (y -{Q}}): XE.Pl:, YEW}. Hence either every block of .pl: is incident with at least one point of r6' 1 or every block of W is incident with at least one point of r6' 2. In either event we again have a contradiction. The result now follows. 0
Note that, by introducing a little notation, the relationship between the above three methods of construction can be clarified. If..;({ is constructed from .1{ and !l! using the method of Construction 1.5 then we write ..;({ =.1{.!l!, and we call ..;({ the product of .1{ and !l!. Then, the method of Construction 1.6 is simply ..;({ = .1{PU.1{p.!l!, and the method of Construction 1.7 is ..;({=.1{PU!l!QU.1{P.PQ.
Further developmeuts

F={
We have so far considered only the case where pairs of users wish to have the means to communicate securely. This idea can be generalized to the situation where every subset of users of size at most g needs to have a key known only to the members of the group. This key can then be used by the members of the closed user group to send secret messages to all the other members of the group.
For this reason we define a (g, w)-collusion resistant KDP «g, w)-CRKDP) to be a w-CRKDP .:Y{= (fJl,.:11, I), for which if f(1),f(2),...,f(g)} and H={h(1),h(2),...,h(w)} are arbitrary g-and w-subsets of {I, 2, ..., v} respectively, then we have:
It should be clear from the above definition that a (2, w)-CRKDP is precisely the same object as a w-CRKDP.
Before giving examples of these structures we need the following generalization of Lemma 3.4 above: Lemma 4.2. Suppose that .:1{ = (!P, :?JJ, /) is a finite incidence structure. Then if g, w~ 1, .:1{is a (g, w+ l)-CRKDP if and only if.:1{P is a (g, w)-CRKDP for every Pe!P.
Proof. First suppose that .:Y{is a (g, w+ 1)-CRKDP. Choose Pefl', and then choose a set of g points, < § say, from .:Y{P. Suppose OJfis a further (disjoint) set of w points from .:Y{P. Then OJfU {P} is a (w+ I)-set of points from .:Y{, and hence there is a block incident with all the points in ffj which is not incident with any point from OJfU {P}. Since this block is not incident with P it must be a block of .:Y{P, and the result follows. Now suppose that.:Y{P is a (g, w)-CRKDP for every Pefl'. Now choose a set of g points < § C fl' and further let :?1:be a set of w + I points from fl' (disjoint from < §). If we suppose that Qe:?1:, then we know that.:Y{Q is a (g, w)-CRKDP. Hence there exists a block in .:Y{Q which is incident with all the points in ffj but which is not incident with any point from :?1: -{ Q}. This immediately gives us a block in .:Y{ which is incident with all the points in ffj but yet is not incident with any point in :?1:. The result follows. 0
Using this lemma we can now show that I-designs provide useful examples of (g, w)-CRKDPs (generalizing Example 3.5 above). First observe that any (g+I)-design is a (g, I)-CRKDP (since Ag>Ag+l in any (g+ I)-design). Now, by noting that if .:Y{is a t-design then.:Y{P is a (t-I)-design for any point P from .:Y{, the result follows by induction on w (using Lemma 4.2 above).
Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a number of new concepts, and shown how the theory of incidence structures may be applied to key management problems. Fundamental questions arising out of this work, such as finding optimal solutions to the problems posed by particular situations, will be considered in future papers.
